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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
The test for pleadings is the avoidance of prejudice to the
opposing party. The burden is expressly placed upon one who
attacks a pleading to show that he is prejudiced.60 The question,
therefore, is whether the request for equitable relief will prejudice
the defendant when plaintiff is entitled only to legal relief. Without
more it will not. The "theory of the pleadings" idea has been
slowly eroded and there is no longer a distinction in procedure
between law and equity.61 Furthermore, if it appears during
the course of the trial that a legal remedy is appropriate,
CPLR 4103 provides that either party may demand a jury.62
Thus, these provisions presaged the instant case, which appears to
finally lay to rest the law-equity distinctions for more expeditious
dispositions of civil contests.
CPLR 3024(c).: Untimeliness not a bar to motion to strike
prejudicial matter.
CPLR 3024(b) provides that a party may move to strike
scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a pleading,
and 3024(c) states that notice of such a motion "shall be served
within twenty days after service of the challenged pleading."
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of this section, 63 the
supreme court, in Szolosi v. Long Island R.R.," held that a
motion to strike prejudicial matter should not be denied solely
because it is untimely.
The CPLR begins with the proviso that the statute "shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every civil judicial proceeding.' '65 Furthermore,
it allows the court to permit correction of mistakes or defects
upon such terms as are just,6  or if no substantial right of a party
is prejudiced, to entirely disregard the defect or mistake.67
complaint was framed in equity, there was no authority to grant merely
legal relief. See also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3013, supp. commentary
71 (1966).
60Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st
Dep't 1964).
61 CPLR 103.
G This pervading liberality is reflected in Diener v. Dierner, 8 N.Y.2d
206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960), where a lower court granted
a separation on the ground of cruelty and the Court of Appeals affirmed
on the ground of abandonment.
63WACHTEL$- NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 157 (1963);
3 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW Yoax CvnL PRAcTIcE 1 3024.16 (1965).64 52 Misc. 2d 1081, 277 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1967).
65 CPLR 104.
66 CPLR 2001.
67 CPLR 3026.
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The Szolosi court considered the above sections and added
that if the material was prejudicial before -the time period elapsed,
it was just as prejudicial after. And, since a "paring" of the
complaint would not prejudice the plaintiff, the court decided
that untimeliness should not bar the motion to strike.
This case marks a further relaxation of strict rules of pleading:
the disposition of such a motion will not depend on arbitrary time
limits, but rather on the equities in issue. However, since avoidance
of prejudice is the court's object, untimely' 3024(c) motions will
still be denied if plaintiff would be prejudiced by their being
granted.
ARTIcLE 31 - DiscLosupE
CPLR 3101(d): Employee's accident report deemed material
prepared for litigation.
Subsection (d) of CPLR 3101 conditionally exempts "material
prepared for litigation" from the section's general mandate that
there shall be full disclosure of all material evidence in civil
actions in New York. The issue of whether or not accident reports
qualify as "material prepared for litigation" has been a much
disputed question, often giving rise to irreconcilable decisions and
opinions.
The cases of Kandel v. Tocher" and Finegold v. Lewis6" were
the first major decisions to lend some clarity to this area. Both
cases, recognizing that liability insurance companies, in effect, are
but substitutes for attorneys, held that statements made by
the insured to the liability insurer qualify as "material prepared
for litigation" under CPLR 3101(d) unless such information can
be "duplicated" elsewhere. 70  In effect, communications between
the insured and the liability insurer enjoy a presumption that
they are materials prepared for litigation. 7' But, if the recipient
of an accident report is not a liability insurer, e.g., a fire insurer,
the presumption disappears because the fire insurer does not
usually defend the insured. It must be shown in each such
instance that the report was in fact prepared for litigation to be
entitled to 3101(d) protection.7 2
6822 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1st Dep't 1965).
6922 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
70 For further discussion of these cases see The Biamutal Survey of
New York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 122, 154 (1965).
717B McKINNEy'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary 11 (1966).
72Brunswick Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 182,
278 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't 1967); Welch v. Globe Indem. Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 70, 267 N.Y.S2d 48 (3d Dep't 1965).
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